

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 EB-07 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3814

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: SPC MEETING 17

REF: A. USNATO 3753 151545 Z JUL 75

B. STATE 161503

SUMMARY: THE SPC AGAIN CONSIDERED PARAS 1 AND 3 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AHG IN ITS JULY 17 SESSION THE BRACKETTED (MIGHT) (WOULD) LANGUAGE IN PARA 1 REMAINS. THE NETHERLANDS CONTINUES TO OPPOSE THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 1 WHICH BELGIUM INTERPRETS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE EAST TO AGREE TO WESTERN GOALS BEFORE THE ALLIES WOULD DISCUSS OPTION III. THE FRG REP PORPOSED A NEW AMENDMENT TO PARA 3 WHICH IS INCLUDED AS AN ALTERNATIVE IN THE NEW IS DRAFT. THE NETHERLANDS REP MOVED FROM SUPPORTING THE US AMENDMENT TO JOIN ITALY, CANADA, BELGIUM, THE FRG AND THE UK IN OPPOSING IT. THE US POSITION IS NOW ISOLATED IN SUPPORTING AN EXPLICIT "CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES" RATIONALE, BUT WE BELIEVE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE MAY SECRET

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STILL BE POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE FOLLOWS A REVISED IS DRAFT OF PARAS 1 AND 3 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE T THE AHG AS IT EMERGED FROM THE SPC DISCUSSION OF JULY 17.

THERE WERE NO CHANGES TO THE FIRST PART OF PARA 1 AS AMENDED DURING THE JULY 14 SPC SESSION (REF A).

2. REGARDING THE SECOND PART OF PARA 1, THE NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) REPORTED NO CHANGE IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO RETAIN THE BRACKETS IN THE SUB-CHAPEAU AROUND THE PHRASE "... ON CONDITION THAT ALL THESE GOALS ARE AGREED IN PHASE I OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT: "(PARA 6, EF A). HE SAID THIS PHRASE COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO ALL ALLIED OBJECTIVES AS A PRE-CONDITION TO ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION ON OPTION III; HE WAS SURE THIS WAS NOT THE REAL INTENTION OF THE SPC. THE BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) REPLIED THAT SUCH IS EXACTLY THE INTENTION OF HIS AUTHORITIES. THE ALLIES MUST REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE DETAILS OF OPTION III UNTIL AFTER THE EAST ACCEPTS THE ALLIED GOALS. HIS AUTHORITIES REGARD THIS AS A FUNDAMENTAL POINT AND WILL NOT ALLOW IT TO BE DELETED.

3. THE NETHERLANDS AND FRG (HOYNCK) REPS REACHED A COMPROMISE ON LANGUAGE IN THE FIRST TIE OF THE SECOND PART OF PARA 1 (SEE BELOW) WHICH THEY WILL SUBMIT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES.

4. THE FRG REP CIRCULATED A NEW FIFTH SENTENCE FOR PARA 3 (THE "EITHER" PORTION OF PARA 3 BELOW) WHICH WAS DRAWN FROM THE FIRST SENTENCE OF HIS PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF JULY 14 (PARA 11, REF A), TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE BELGIAN AMENDMENT (PARA 16, REF A).

5. THE US REP (PEREZ) AGAIN SUPPORTED THE US LANGUAGE PROPOSED ON JULY 14 (PARA 4, REF B). HE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE US PROPOSAL

BEGIN TEXT

STATEMENT ON US RATIONALE FOR OPTION III

MY AUTHORITIES WISH US TO MAINTAIN THE AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE WHICH WE INTRODUCED AT THE JULY 14 MEETING.

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WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AMENDMENT A MAJOR ALTERATION OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE WHICH CAME OUT OF OUR JULY 7 MEETING.

RATHER, IT MERELY BRINGS OUT A LITTLE MORE THE RATIONALE THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THAT DOCUMENT.

WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THAT RATIONALE. WE WOULD LIKE THEREFORE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY OUR REASONING.

FIRST, LET ME MAKE CLEAR THAT IN COMPARING THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES, I.E. OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE DISPARITY IN MANPOWER AND TANKS, AND EASTERN CONCERN ABOUT OUR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THERE IS NO IMPLICATION WHATSOEVER THAT THESE CONCERNS ARE OF EQUAL VALIDITY.

WE CLEARLY LABEL THESE AS "EXPRESSED" CONCERNS.

WHAT IS OUR PURPOSE IN STATING THE EXPRESSED CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES? IT IS TO ESTABLISH A FIRM RATIONALE FOR 1) GETTING WHAT WE WANT FROM THE EAST IN RETURN FOR OPTION III; AND 2) OPPOSING EASTERN DEMANDS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL KINDS OF EQUIPMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. OBVIOUSLY WE MUST START WITH ALLIED DETERMINATION TO GET THE REDUCTIONS WE WANT FROM THE EAST, AND TO RESIST EASTERN DEMANDS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL KINDS OF EQUIPMENT. BUT A GOOD RATIONALE, FOR USE WITH THE EAST, IS ALSO IMPORTANT IN GAINING OUR ENDS.

NOW, THE EAST HAS EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN ON MANY OCCASIONS ABOUT ALLIED NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE EAST HAS POINTED OUT ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COMPENSATES FOR THEIR ADVANTAGE ON THE GROUND.

USING A RATIONALE WHICH RELATES TO THE EXPRESSED CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES THUS REINFORCES OUR ARGUMENT THAT IN RETURN FOR REDUCTION OF OUR NUCLEARS, WE GET A REDUCTION IN GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES AND TANKS. ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES DO NOT REINFORCE OUR ARGUMENT IN THIS MANNER.

USING A RATIONALE RELATING TO THE EXPRESSED CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES ALSO SERVES AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST EASTERN DEMANDS TO INCLUDE OTHER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT. NOTHING WILL STOP THE OTHER SIDE FROM THINKING UP NEW CONCERNS, BUT THE FACT REMAINS SECRET

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THAT THEIR MOST FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERN IS FOR OUR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. THIS RATIONALE, RELATING TO THE EAST'S MOST FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERNS IS THUS A BETTER SAFEGUARD THAN THE "ADD-ON" APPROACH AGAINST EASTERN DEMANDS FOR INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL KINDS OF EQUIPMENT.  
END TEXT

6. THE FRG REP SAID THIS ONLY RETURNED THE SPC TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENTS MADE THREE WEEKS AGO. HE SEES THE US MAKING TWO ARGUMENTS: FIRST, THE US WANTS TO CLARIFY THAT THE ALLIES ARE ONLY TRADING-OFF ONE THREATENING ELEMENT FOR ANOTHER. HOWEVER, THIS IMPLIES THAT THE THREAT FROM BOTH ELEMENTS ARE THE SAME AND HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE TRUE, HE SAID THO ACCEPT THE SOVIET THESIS THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE "THREATENING" WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY; THE OTHER SIDE WILL KNOW OUR OBJECTIVE FROM PARA 1, AND GET THE POINT WITHOUT OUR STATING IT EXPLICITLY IN PARA 3. THE SECOND US ARGUMENT IS THAT THEY WISH TO DRAW THE LINE AGAINST FURTHER EASTERN DEMANDS. HE BELIEVES THE US LANGUAGE IS TOO VAGUE, HOWEVER, AND THAT THE FRG PROPOSAL IS MORE CONVINCING. HE SAID THE US LANGUAGE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE ON THIS POINT WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO THE EUROPEANS.

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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7. THE BELGIAN REP AGREED WITH THE FRG ARGUMENT. HE SAID ALL ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO PRESENT A RATIONALE FOR OPTION III. ONE SUCH RATEIONALE HAS EXISTED SINCE THE THREE US OPTIONS WERE CONSIDERED IN 1973. OPTION III WAS INTENDED AS A "SWEETNER", A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR THE EAST. IT SHOULD HAVE NO MILITARY JUSTIFICATION. THIS IS WHATIS MEANT BY THE "ONE-TIME COMPLEMENT" LANGUAGE IN PARA 1; THE ALLIES ARE MAKING A POLITICAL GESTURE, NOT A MILITARY OFFER. THIS SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THE EAST.

8. THE BELGIAN REP SAID IT IS ALSO DANGEROUS TO ACCEPT EASTERN REASONING ON "THREATENING ELEMENTS", FOR THE EAST WILL CLAIM THAT OTHER "THREATENING ELEMENTS" SHOULD ALSO BE REDUCED. IF US AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES ARE THREATENING, SO ARE COMPARABLE ALLIED ARMAMENTS. HE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ARE OPPOSED TO ANY IMPLICATION THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT BARGAIN ON THE CONTENT OF OPTION III, AND FEEL THAT THE US APPROACH DENIES THIS ON IMPLICATION LESS EFFECTIVELY THAN THE FRG APPROACH.

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9. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE HAGUE DOES NOT GET AS EXERCISED ON THIS POINT AS DO BONN AND BRUSSELSHOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE GERMAN AND BELGIAN ARGUMENTS AGAINST LETTING THE

EAST EXPAND THE LIST OF "THREATENING ELEMENTS" ARE STRONGER THAN THE US. (COMMENT: THE NETHERLANDS REP SUPPORTED THE US POSITION ON JULY 14-REF A. END COMMENT) THE UK (SINTON), ITALIAN (SFARA) AND CANADIAN (BARTLEMAN) REPS ALSO SUPPORTED THE FRG/BELGIAN POSITION.

10. THIS IS REP (PABSCH) ASKED IF THE US COULD EXPLAIN WHY THE ORDER OF "AIR AND NUCLEAR" WAS REVERSED IN ITS AMENDMENT (GUIDANCE REQUESTED PARA 20, SUB3), REF A). THE US REP SAID NOT YET.

11. THE REVISED IS DRAFT CONTAINS THE NEW FRG AMENDMENT AS THE "EITHER" PORTION BELOW, WITH THE US AMENDMENT AS THE "OR" PORTION, AND THE "PLUS" PORTION IS THE LAST SENTENCE INSISTED UPON BY THE FRG REP.

BEGIN TEXT

MBFR: DRAFT GUIDANCE ON INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS

1. IN THEIR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED ON 22 NOVEMBER, 1973, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ALLIES PROPOSED, INTER ALIA, THAT, IN PHASE I THERE SHOULD BE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES AND A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES AS TO THE GOAL OF THE NGOTIATIONS TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II. SPECIFICALLY, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT:

- BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, APPROPRIATELY DEFINED IN PHASE I, ON OVERALL, APPROPRIATELY DEFINED IN PHASE I, ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II. THIS COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING BEGIN BRACKET MIGHT END BRACKET BEGIN BRACKET WOULD END BRACKET BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE;  
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- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS 29,000 US SOLDIERS;

- THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

THE ALLIES ARE NOW OFFERING BEGIN BRACKET, ON CONDITION THAT ALL THESE GOALS ARE AGREED IN PHASE I OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, END BRACKET THAT:

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW AS A ONE-TIME COMPLE-

MENT TO THE WESTERN REDUCTION CONTRIBUTION A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NAMELY 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 54 US NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT AND 36 US PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS;

BEGIN BRACKET - THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, RESULTING IN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WHICH BEGIN BRACKET MIGHT END BRACKET BEGIN BRACKET WOULD END BRACKET BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 900,000 MEN. END BRACKET

2. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. AS REGARDS TACTICS THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, PUT FORWARD ALL THE PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED. IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATION, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD STRESS THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS MOVE AND REQUEST THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING PUT FORWARD AS A ONE-TIME OFFER TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THEY SHOULD ALSO STATE THAT

EITHER  
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BEGIN BRACKET THE ALLIES MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, WHICH CONSTITUTES THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THEY SHOULD ADDRESS THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS AS THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTORS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE NEW ALLIED MOVE, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE ABOUT NUCLEAR AND AIR ELEMENTS  
END BRACKET

OR

BEGIN BRACKET THIS NEW ALLIED MOVE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT EXPRESSED EASTERN CONCERNS ABOUT AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERN OF REDUCING THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS WHICH IS THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ALSO EMPHASISE THAT THIS EXCHANGE INVOLVING MILITARY ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF EXPRESSED CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES  
END BRACKETS WOULD CONSTITUTE A UNIQUE BEGIN BRACKET  
TRADE  
END BRACKET BEGIN BRACKET OFFER  
END BRACKET AND IS NOT BEING  
PUT FORWARD AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR

AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT.

PLUS

BEGIN BRACKET THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, IF AND WHEN PRESSED,  
SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE EASTERN SIDE THAT THIS OFFER  
IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS FINAL, IN THE SENSE THAT NO OTHER OFFER  
FOR THE REDUCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND CAN BE HOPED  
FOR IN EITHER PHASE I OR PHASE II FROM EITHER THE UNITED STATES  
OR ANY OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANT. END BRACKET  
END TEXT

12. THE SPC AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 22  
TO CONSIDER THE DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AHG AND A US DRAFT OF  
THE SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER CONTAINING ALLIED AGREEMENTS ON  
POINTS NOT COVERED IN THE DRAFT GUIDANCE, WHICH US REP HOPED  
MIGHT BE AVAILABLE. THE FRG REP SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A LONG  
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INSTRUCTION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FRG ARGUMENT ON THE  
COMMON CEILING WHICH HE WILL CONDENSE AND CIRCULATE.

13. COMMENT: THE DEFECTION OF THE NETHERLANDS FROM US  
AMENDMENT TO THE END OF PARA 3 MEANS THAT NO OTHER COUNTRY  
SUPPORTS SUCH AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF THE US RATIONALE,  
WHILE FRG, BELGIUM, CANADA, UK, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS  
OPPOSE IT. SINCE THE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE BEFORE THE SPC  
CONTAINS ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE US RATIONALE, IT SEEMS  
TO US THAT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE IS WITHIN REACH. WE ASSUME  
US WOULD WANT, IN SECOND LINE OF FRB "EITHER" PARAGRAPH,  
"GROUND FORCE MANPOWER" TO BE CHANGED TO "GROUND FORCES,"  
AND THE END OF THE "OR" PARAGRAPH TO REFER TO "TRADE" RATHER  
THAN "OFFER." IN THAT CASE, THE LANGUAGE WOULD REFER TO THE  
MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTOR, TO EASTERN CONCERNS, AND TO THE  
UNIQUE TRADE. WE BELIEVE THE SPC CAN EVENTUALLY AGREE TO  
DEAL WITH THE CONTENT OF "PLUS" PARAGRAPH IN THE SUPPLEMENT.  
WE THINK THE SPC COULD AGREE TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION ALONG  
THE ABOVE LINES, AND CONSIDER AGREEMENT TO A MORE EXPLICIT  
STATEMENT OF THE "UNIQUE TRADE" RATIONALE TO BE HIGHLY  
UNLIKELY. END COMMENT

14. ACTION REQUESTED: IN TIME FOR SPC MEETING TUESDAY,  
JULY 22: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN LIGHT OF ABOVE COMMENT. BRUCE

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